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EVALUATION OF THE TAUM SAUK UPPER RESERVOIR FAILURE
Quentin Gehring
Shannon & Wilson, Inc.
Fairbanks, Alaska-USA 99709

Ronaldo Luna
Missouri University of Science and Technology
Rolla, Missouri-USA 65401

ABSTRACT
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was built in the early 1960’s as a water storage reservoir for hydro-electric energy production. The
reservoir was created by blasting rock from the top of Proffit Mountain. The rock debris generated was then used to construct a kidney
shaped earthen embankment atop the mountain. The reservoir is located in Reynolds County near the town of Lesterville, Missouri. The
Upper Reservoir was approximately 95 feet in depth and covered a surface area of roughly 55 acres. The reservoir had the capacity to hold
nearly 1.5 billion gallons of water. The Upper reservoir underwent a catastrophic failure on the morning of December 14th, 2005 releasing
most of its stored water down the northwest side of Proffit Mountain. An approximate 700-feet wide breach occurred along the northwest
radius of the rock-fill dike, causing severe damage to state park property. No fatalities resulted from the failure events. This paper
evaluates different failure mechanisms of the reservoir based on three distinct failure hypotheses. Conclusions are then made based on the
analyses and discussion of each mechanism, categorized in terms of the likely contribution to the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir failure.

INTRODUCTION
During the early morning hours of December 14, 2005, the Taum
Sauk Upper Reservoir rock-fill dike underwent a catastrophic
failure, releasing more than a billion gallons of water down the
northwest side of Proffit Mountain. The release of water
downstream ripped the land of existing vegetation and soil cover
and the resulting wall of water demolished one residence directly
in the flood path. Severe flash flooding was experienced on the
East Fork of the Black River, including Johnson’s Shut-Ins
geological features and Johnson’s Shut-Ins State Park
campground. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the consequences of the
water release from the Upper Reservoir. Figure 1 displays
downstream sedimentation and a portion of the downstream flow
path. Figure 2 displays the residence that was demolished by the
flash flood waters.
The breach occurred along the northwest radius of the Upper
Reservoir over a distance of about 680 feet at the crest and
through the entire height of the dike. Figure 3 illustrates the
breach area of the rock-fill dike. Water began overtopping the
reservoir on the morning of the failure. Overtopping at specific
locations around the perimeter of the Upper Reservoir and
possible failure mechanisms associated with the failure events
after initiation of overtopping, are within the scope of this study.
The cause of overtopping is of importance but is not within the
scope of this evaluation.
The Taum Sauk power plant is located in Reynolds County,
Missouri, approximately 90 miles southwest of St. Louis,
Missouri, in the Johnson’s Shut-Ins Quadrangle. The power plant
facilities are approximately 4.5 miles northwest of Lesterville,
Missouri, and approximately 1 mile east of Highway N.
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Fig. 1. The upper reservoir breach and a portion of the flow
path (photo courtesy of J. Spooner, 2005)
On December 15, 2005, select NHMI members embarked on a
preliminary site reconnaissance in response to the Taum Sauk
Upper Reservoir failure. Access to the site was limited; however
one member of the team was granted access to the Upper
Reservoir area and allowed to document what he witnessed.
Other team members were involved with mapping the general
flood water extent in the lower regions of the flow regime near
Missouri State Highway N and the entrance to Johnson’s ShutIns State Park. All members witnessed first hand the effects that
the flood waters had on the surrounding landscape and also
realized the destructive power of such an event. Figures 1
through 3 are photographs taken during the initial site
reconnaissance. Additional details related to the site
reconnaissance were published by Witt and Hoffman (2005).
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Geologic Setting

Fig. 2. Remnants of the Park Ranger’s residence (Hoffman,
2005).

Fig. 3. View of breach looking northwest across reservoir
(Hoffman, 2005).
Several efforts were made to collect data for this study. The
USGS Mid Continent Geographic Science Center (MCGSC)
contracted an aerial survey on December 16, 2005. The aerial
survey used Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) to capture the
site topography after the failure events. The LiDAR data was
made available to the University of Missouri – Rolla for this
evaluation. Additionally, the MoDNR conducted an elevation
survey to measure the remaining concrete parapet wall panels.
This survey was referenced to an existing benchmark to compare
data with previous surveys. These elevation data were made
available for this evaluation and are presented in Appendix B of
Gehring (2006). Although information and data were not easily
accessible, an adequate amount was collected and key
assumptions were made that allowed the progression of this
evaluation.
The scope of this evaluation involved the post failure
reconnaissance visit to the Upper Reservoir system and
analytical studies based on data published by others. It included
development of several failure mechanism hypotheses, analyses
of the stability of the structural and geotechnical components
under the assumes loading conditions, discussion of the
relevance of each proposed failure mechanism, and classification
of each proposed failure mechanism considering their respective
probability of occurrence. In order to understand this grand
failure case history a thorough description of the geological,
geotechnical and structural conditions at the site are necessary.
BACKGROUND
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The St. Francois Mountains region is a unique area consisting of
Missouri’s oldest landscape. During the Precambrian time
igneous granite rock formed as a molten magma crystallized
deep within the earth’s surface. Volcanoes closer to the surface
also began to erupt large quantities of pyroclastic flows and
rhyolitic lava (Unklesbay and Vineyard, 1992). Thick layers of
pyroclastic materials were deposited throughout the region as
either air fall or ash flow tuff. Residual heat from the eruptions
often melted or “welded” the pyroclastic ash fragments together
and cooled to form a hard igneous rock known as welded tuff.
Most of the ash flow tuff present in the Proffit Mountain region
is reddish in color and of felsic or rhyolitic composition. Various
rhyolites and tuffs have a cumulative thickness of several
thousand feet in the St. Francois Mountains. Many large bodies
of reddish to grayish granite are included within this material.
After the decrease and eventual halt of volcanic activity during
the Precambrian time, the area was subjected to the Ozark dome
uplift (Unklesbay and Vineyard, 1992). The uplift, as well as
erosion, formed the igneous knobs and ridges common to the St.
Francois Mountains of today. When the Cambrian seas began to
rise, much of the region became blanketed by water, leaving the
igneous knobs and ridges as highpoints or islands. Deposition of
sedimentary rocks during this period left thick layers of
sandstone and carbonate sediments on the sea floor that draped
the slopes of the igneous highpoints and knobs.
Regression of the Cambrian seas exposed the younger
sedimentary deposits and the igneous highpoints. Erosion and
weathering of the Cambrian rocks cut distinct drainage patterns
through the sedimentary deposits. Present day drainage patterns
preferentially cut through sedimentary deposits down to
underlying steep granite ridges. These ridges resist the effects of
weathering and erosion more than the younger, softer,
sedimentary rocks. When rivers cut down into these ancient
bedrock ridges, their flow is locally restricted, forming steep,
closed in chutes called shut-ins. Johnson’s Shut-Ins on the East
Fork of the Black River is an example of this type of feature, and
is located below the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir. As with the
most of the Ozark Plateau, the St. Francois Mountains were not
glaciated during the Pleistocene. Lack of glaciation preserved
many ancient, deeply weathered zones of bedrock and soil,
which are locally present throughout the region.
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir
The following is a summary of the components that comprise the
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir. The information was obtained
from a report provided by AmerenUE and made available soon
after the failure (Rizzo, 2006). This evaluation focuses on the
upper reservoir at the top of Proffit Mountain. Figure 4 illustrates
an aerial view of the Upper Reservoir with locations of various
components discussed below. The upper reservoir dike is about
6,500 feet long and closes to form a kidney-shaped reservoir.
The concrete-faced dumped rockfill dam (CFRD) had a
maximum height in the range of 85 feet above the base of the
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reservoir. The base of the reservoir is around elevation 1505
feet. At the top of the CFRD a 10-foot-high concrete parapet
wall rests on the inside edge of the 12-foot wide crest. Survey
data indicate that the parapet wall panels have settled over time
and at some locations are as much as 2 feet lower than the design
elevation.

3. Foundation was prepared by removal of most deleterious
materials by dozers. A note on the Drawings that applies
to the 70 feet nearest the upstream toe reads as follows:

A horseshoe shaped access tunnel exists through the northern
side of the dike and provides access to the reservoir floor. The
upstream face was fitted with a hinged steel bulkhead gate that
opens into the reservoir. The inlet/outlet conduit consists of a
451 feet deep, 27.2 feet diameter vertical shaft shaped at the top
as a typical ‘morning glory.’ The top 110-feet of the shaft is
concrete lined and connects to a 4,765 feet long, 25 feet
diameter, unlined horseshoe tunnel. The horseshoe tunnel ties
into a steel lined horizontal tunnel roughly 1,807 feet long and
18.5 feet in diameter. A short penstock then splits the steel lined
tunnel and directs flow to the pump-generating plant. (Rizzo,
2006)

“Remove topsoil and loose, unstable, altered material as
far as possible with bulldozer”
4. Parapet walls were used to retain water on an “everyday”
basis
5. Grout curtain was installed to a depth of about 20 feet.
There is no evidence of the design basis.

“Strip to sound rock with not more than 2 inches
(average) of dirt. This dirt to be thoroughly saturated
before placing.”

No conclusions based on adequacies of construction practices
and/or procedures are addressed herein, but it is important to note
the dam remained functional throughout its 40 plus years of
service.
Remediation and Upgrades

Spillways are typically specified to protect dams, dikes, and
reservoirs from the potential effects of overtopping water. The
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was designed without a spillway
system. One possible reason for not specifying a spillway
system for the reservoir is the lack of topographic drainage area
contribution to the total inflow into the Upper Reservoir. The
reservoir’s only contributions to inflow were from the intended
pump-back procedures for filling and direct rainfall on the Upper
Reservoir itself. This means that overtopping could occur from
over-pumping/overfilling or excess rainfall with the latter being
highly improbable. Furthermore, to prevent overtopping of the
rock-fill dike by over-pumping, a system of redundant water
level instruments was specified in the design.

Figure 4. Aerial view of Upper Reservoir.
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was constructed in the early
1960’s. It is important to note that design and construction
practices today were not the state-of-the-practice in the early
1960’s. The following is a partial list the specifications
incorporated into the construction of the Upper Reservoir (Rizzo,
2006).
1. Rock was dumped and re-positioned by sluicing with water
(jets) from monitors
2. Fines were removed by sluicing after rock was dumped
into position
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Initial filling of the Upper Reservoir occurred in 1963. Leakage
from the Upper Reservoir was a re-occurring problem and
concern since the initial filling. For example, at one time a
sudden increase in seepage was experienced and emergency
measures were taken to remediate the situation. The remediation
required plugging two holes in the reservoir floor with concrete.
Another episode of increased leakage occurred three days later
resulting in complete shut down and mandatory repair. The
repair required excavating a long trench down to bedrock and
then backfilling the excavated trench with concrete. Throughout
the following years a number of repairs were made focusing
more on leakage through the horizontal and vertical joints in the
concrete liner with an emphasis placed on the joints between the
concrete liner and bedrock, the joint at the upstream toe of the
parapet wall, and the joint between the concrete liner and the
plinth (FERC,2006).
The Taum Sauk power plant began to be used more extensively
after increasing plant efficiency in 1999. After increasing plant
efficiency, higher rates of leakage were witnessed until the
installation of a geosynthetic liner in 2004. The liner was placed
over the original upstream concrete liner. The geosynthetic
membrane on the interior side slopes was 80 mil thick High
Density Polyethylene (HDPE). During the 12 months prior to
the failure events and after the installation of the geosynthetic
liner, observed leakage was significantly reduced (FERC, 2006).

HYPOTHESES OF FAILURE MECHANISMS
#1 - Rising Phreatic Surface and stability failure
The following summarizes failure mechanism #1: As
overtopping of the Upper Reservoir rock-fill dike was initiated,
water spilling over the concrete parapet wall infiltrated into the
dike. The resultant increase of water within the dike
subsequently caused the phreatic surface to rise within the rockfill. The rising phreatic surface exerted excess pore pressures
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within the rock-fill material, consequently reducing the effective
stresses acting on the bedrock and rock-fill interface. The
reduced effective stresses lowered the shear strength of the rockfill material. The reduction of effective stresses caused either a
global slope stability or localized toe slope stability failure on the
downstream slope of the Upper Reservoir.
If a localized toe stability failure occurred due to the
aforementioned reduction of effective stresses, the global
stability of the reservoir would be sufficiently weakened to the
point of global slope stability failure. The capacity of the rockfill dike to hold back the contained water, after either case of
slope failure, would have been severely compromised. Complete
failure due to a rising phreatic surface and reduced slope stability
could have resulted. Figure 5 illustrates sketches of each stage of
the proposed failure mechanism.
OVERTOPPING WATER

over the concrete parapet wall was allowed to flow down and
along the downstream slope surface of the dike. If the water
flowing along the surface reached the toe of the slope with a
sufficient flow rate, a hydraulic jump could have been formed.
Once a hydraulic jump formed, erosion could have been initiated
at the downstream toe of the reservoir. This erosion process
removed rock-fill material beginning at the downstream toe and
progressively moved upward along the slope. The removal of
material is similar to that of the localized downstream toe
stability and could have affected the global slope stability of the
dike. Once a sufficient amount of material was removed, the
downstream global slope stability was severely compromised to
the point of failure. The capacity of the rock-fill dike to hold
back the contained water, after global slope failure, would have
been severely compromised. Complete failure due to erosion at
the toe and reduced slope stability could have resulted. Figure 6
illustrates sketches of each stage of the proposed failure
mechanism.
OVERTOPPING WATER

INFILTRATION

ROCK-FILL

ROCK-FILL
BEDROCK

(a)

BEDROCK

RISING PHREATIC SURFACE
(a)

OVERTOPPING WATER

OVERTOPPING WATER

ROCK-FILL

SLOPE FAILURE

ROCK-FILL

TOE EROSION

BEDROCK

BEDROCK

RISING PHREATIC SURFACE

(b)

(b)
OVERTOPPING WATER

OVERFLOWING WATER
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
AND PROGRESSIVE EROSION

ROCK-FILL

SLOPE FAILURE

ROCK-FILL

BEDROCK
(c)

BEDROCK

Fig. 5. Failure mechanism #1.
(a) rising phreatic surface, (b) slope instability, (c)
catastrophic failure with progressive erosion (not to scale).

(c)

Fig. 6. Failure mechanism #2. (not to scale).
(a) water flowing across downstream slope, (b) progressive
toe erosion, (c) resulting slope failure, (d) catastrophic failure
with progressive erosion, same as Fig. 5(c).

#2 - Downstream Toe Erosion and stability failure
The following summarizes failure mechanism #2: As
overtopping of the Upper Reservoir was initiated, water spilling
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#3 - Scour Undermining and parapet wall failure
The following summarizes failure mechanism #3: As
overtopping of the reservoir was initiated, water spilling over the
concrete parapet wall caused erosion and scouring at the
downstream crest of the dike. This process began to undermine
the concrete parapet wall foundation. As undermining and
scouring progressed, the rock-fill material was transported down
the slope. Once the undermining process removed a sufficient
amount of rock-fill, the stability of the concrete parapet wall and
the shear capacity of the rock-fill directly below the wall became
severely compromised to the point of either wall failure and/or
shear failure. After the aforementioned wall/crest failure(s),
more water (10-feet) and consequently more flow was released in
the area of the breach. The additional flow continued the erosion
process down to the toe of the reservoir yielding the catastrophic
failure. Figure 7 illustrates sketches of each stage of the
proposed failure mechanism.

OVERTOPPING WATER

ROCK-FILL

BEDROCK

(a)

OVERTOPPING WATER

CONCRETE PARAPET WALL
SCOURING AND UNDERMINING

DISCUSSION OF FAILURE HYPOTHESES RELATED TO
ANALYSES
The analyses of each hypothesis made in this study were
included in much detail in Gehring (2006). The following
sections summarize the main points of the analyses and present
related discussions.
Rising Phreatic Surface and stability failure
Assuming a free draining rock-fill, the possibility that a phreatic
surface could rise to the extent of impending reservoir failure is
unlikely. However, the presence of fines was noted in certain
areas of the dike by Rizzo (2006). Given the noted fines content
in the rock-fill, a phreatic surface rise was proposed as a failure
mechanism. A rise in phreatic surface elevation within the dike
would cause a decrease in effective stresses throughout the rockfill mass underwater. The ability of the rock-fill material to
dissipate excess pore pressures radially from the sections of
overtopping makes it difficult to comprehend the rise in phreatic
surface conditions needed to initiate global slope instability,
localized toe slope instability, or both localized toe and global
slope instability. However, the condition of a rising phreatic
surface was analyzed in terms of localized toe and global slope
stability.
The stability analyses show that for a condition with no excess
pore pressures present within the dike, safety factors calculated
using the Spencer method were 1.8 and 1.9 for localized toe and
global slope stability, respectively. These factors are acceptable
when compared to the minimum design recommendation safety
factor of 1.5. When using the more conservative Bishop method
the safety factor against global instability was close to 1.6 and
the safety factor against localized toe slope instability was most
nearly 1.5. Both factors are adequate when compared with
design standards.

LINER

The phreatic surface was incrementally raised for the analyses.
The safety factors began to drop, as expected, for both localized
toe and global slope stability. A safety factor of nearly 1.5 was
obtained for both slope stability conditions when the phreatic
surface reached a theoretical elevation of roughly 50 feet above
the upstream toe of the reservoir. The Spencer method was used
for calculations. The calculated safety factors were still adequate
when compared with design standards. The calculated safety
factor for both slope stability conditions did not reach 1.0 until a
theoretical rise in phreatic surface elevation was approximately
80 feet above the upstream toe of the reservoir. A safety factor of
1.0 corresponds to impending failure.

ROCK-FILL

(b)

OVERFLOWING WATER

CONCRETE PARAPET WALL
ROCK-FILL

(c)

Fig. 7. Failure mechanism #3. (not to scale).
(a) overtopping water, (b) scouring and undermining, (c)
parapet wall failure, (d) catastrophic failure with progressive
erosion, same as Fig. 5(c)

Paper No. 2.61

Moreover, before installation of the geosynthetic liner in 2004,
information suggests that seepage from the Upper Reservoir
became increasingly more costly as the life of the reservoir
increased. It is noted that the reservoir remained stable before
installation of the geosynthetic liner even with seepage pore
pressures allowed to build up. This note suggests that the
reservoir had experienced effects similar to a rising phreatic
surface in the past. Although stability may have been in jeopardy
during times of increased seepage, performance history suggests
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the reservoir could withstand some amount of excess pore water
pressure build up.

fill dike failure.
Scour undermining of parapet wall

Given the time frame of the failure events, it is unlikely that the
phreatic surface elevation in the area of the breach reached an
impending failure condition.
From the aforementioned
discussion and the performed analyses, a rising phreatic surface
condition was not likely responsible for the rock-fill dike failure.
Downstream toe erosion and stability failure
Erosive and scour forces are difficult to quantify in terms of
magnitude and extent. With erosion and scour, the contribution
of flow characteristics causes changes in channel characteristics
and changes in channel characteristics causes changes in flow
characteristics. This reveals that the erosion and scouring
processes are not independently controlled by flow
characteristics nor independently controlled by channel
characteristics. In other words, flow characteristics affect
channel characteristics and channel characteristics affect flow
characteristics. An attempt was made to identify the energy
needed to initiate erosion at the downstream toe assuming that no
changes in channel characteristics occurred on the downstream
slope of the dike until the overtopping flow of water reached the
downstream toe of the reservoir.
Through the analyses it was determined that a sufficient flow
could have existed to mobilize granular material at the toe and
initiate the erosion process. If this process occurred it would
have severely weakened the rock-fill dike structure in terms of
global slope stability. This effect would be similar to the effect
that a localized toe failure would have on global slope stability.
In areas where the overtopping flow was not sufficient to keep
mobilized granular material suspended, deposition of the material
along the downstream slope and along the downstream toe
occurred. Evidence of an accumulation of granular material at
the toe of the dike in non-failed, overtopped, areas suggests that
a similar condition may have occurred in the breach segment
before failure.
Analyses were conducted to quantify the possibility that
overtopping water could initiate the erosion process along the
downstream slope. The infinite slope analyses revealed that the
downstream slope was marginally safe with respect to sloughing
and planar failure and exhibited a safety factor of 1.1. Flow
across the surface of the downstream slope or infiltration as
water flowed down the slope could have reduced the safety
factor and increased the effects of erosion, leading to either
increased crest erosion, reduction of the embankment crosssection, and/or increased toe erosion.

The ability of the concrete parapet wall to withstand the applied
loads (mainly water pressure) is paramount to the structural
integrity of the entire Upper Reservoir rock-fill dike structure. If
the parapet wall failed in any way, the sequential flow of water
would have continued the erosion process from the top to the
bottom of the rock-fill dike, resulting in catastrophic failure.
Two mechanisms were proposed that could have lead to the
instability of the parapet wall. They were overturning and
sliding stability of the wall itself and shear failure of the rock-fill
directly beneath the base of the wall.
The analyses revealed that the concrete parapet wall, before
overtopping initiated and during the operational life of the
structure, could effectively withstand the applied loads. The
operational life safety factor against overturning was most nearly
2.4. The operational life safety factor against sliding along the
base was most nearly 1.5. Both analyses did not consider the
geosynthetic liner connections that could increase respective
safety factors. When compared to typical design criteria the
computed safety factors were satisfactory.
Analyses were performed to quantify overtopping water flow and
scouring and undermining at the downstream crest. Figure 8
illustrates the concrete parapet wall profile, the probable
elevation at which overtopping started, and the probable
maximum water elevation during the failure events. The
analyses revealed that overtopping flow could initiate scouring
and undermining. The extent of scouring and undermining
varied as a function of the parapet wall crest elevation and
overtopping flow depth at various locations. Flow depth was
defined as the height of water flowing over the parapet wall
sections.
The segment between panel 70 and panel 74 experienced a
greater effect from scouring and undermining than the location
between panel 43 and panel 54. Due to the lower wall crest
elevations between panel 70 and panel 74 and the resulting
higher flow rates exiting the reservoir at this location. Also, the
segment between panel 70 and panel 74 began overtopping
before the segment between panel 43 and panel 54. The time
factor associated with scouring and undermining caused less
scouring and undermining between panel 43 and panel 54. The
maximum differential settlement between the two locations was
approximately 0.2-feet. If the parapet wall segments in the
breach area experienced settlements similar to panel segments 70
through 74, the effects of scouring and undermining could have
been similar.

The possibility that erosion could take place at the downstream
toe of the Upper Reservoir existed given the condition that no
material mobilization occurred at the downstream crest or along
the downstream slope as water flowed downstream. The
aforementioned discussion and post-failure evidence in other
areas that experienced overtopping discount the likelihood of this
process occurring. From the discussion and analyses,
downstream toe erosion was likely not responsible for the rock-
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Fig. 8. Parapet wall elevation profile (source: MoDNR data).

Based on calculations presented in Gehring (2006), there was a
relatively high potential for the rock-fill material at the crest to
be scoured and eroded. To evaluate the effects of scour
undermining on the stability of the parapet wall, an incremental
approach to the extent of undermining was applied to sliding and
overturning stability calculations. As expected, the resulting
safety factors decreased with increased scour undermining. A
safety factor of 1.0 was obtained for overturning stability when
the scour undermining distance was roughly 3.3 feet, measured
from the downstream toe of the parapet wall. Similarly, a safety
factor of 1.0 was obtained for sliding stability when the scour
undermining distance was roughly 2.0 feet, measured from the
downstream toe of the parapet wall. A safety factor of 1.0
corresponds to impending failure. The analyses results
supplement visual evidence of scouring and undermining within
non-failed overtopped areas. If wall crest elevations in the
breach area were similar to other overtopped segments, the
effects of scouring and undermining could have been similar.
As undermining, scouring, and erosion progressed, the
possibility existed that enough rock fill material was removed
directly beneath the base of the wall to cause a localized soil
shear failure. If localized soil shear failure occurred, the effects
would have been similar to sliding or overturning instability of
the wall. Both proposed circumstances could have caused wall
failure, leading to the eventual complete discharge of stored
water in the reservoir. The near 700-feet wide breach suggests,
in the opinion of the writer, a sudden collapse of parapet wall
segments and continued erosion and scouring down to bedrock.
Although it is difficult to assess which failure mechanism (i.e.
overturning and sliding or localized shear) occurred first, the
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analyses support the concrete parapet wall instability and
subsequent erosion of the rock-fill dike as a possible mode of
catastrophic failure. From the discussion and analyses, the
concrete parapet wall failure and resulting erosion of the rock-fill
dike were likely mechanisms for the reservoir failure.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The events that lead to the failure of the Taum Sauk Upper
Reservoir the morning of December 14, 2005 provided an
opportunity to the academic and professional communities to
learn from this interesting case study and provided a platform to
bring dam safety into the regional and national spotlight. The
desire to learn comes after realizing the potential for loss of life
and the realistic loss of property value.
The scope of this academic exercise did not involve evaluating
the causes leading up to the failure events nor does it attempt to
address the causes pertaining to why the Upper Reservoir was
allowed to overtop. The scope of this exercise was to
systematically evaluate several postulated failure mechanisms
and attempt to categorize each mechanism in terms of their
relevance to the failure events.
Without actually witnessing the failure events as they occurred,
only speculations can be made in terms of the true cause, or
combination of causes, leading to the catastrophic failure of the
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir. In their own right, each proposed
failure mechanism could have contributed solely to the failure
events, or a combination of all three proposed mechanisms could
be the culprit, or another failure mechanism not contemplated
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could be responsible. However, the phenomenon common to the
three proposed failure mechanisms was overtopping water.
Without water overtopping the Upper Reservoir, all three of the
proposed failure mechanisms would be invalid.
Although each mechanism could lead to failure, the analyses and
observations indicate that some failure mechanisms were more
likely than others. The likelihood of occurrence, with 1 being the
most likely and 3 being the least likely, is as follows.
1. Scouring and undermining of parapet wall.
2. Downstream toe erosion and stability failure.
3. Rising phreatic surface and stability failure.
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir, for all practical purposes,
remained stable and operational throughout its 40 plus year
service life. Circumstances such as increased seepage rates and
surficial downstream slope instability were noticed in the past
and may have decreased the overall stability of the Upper
Reservoir in certain areas. The presence and migration of fine
material may have caused greater susceptibility to erosion in
certain areas of the dike. However, the presence and effects of
fine material are not presented in this evaluation.
Acceptable construction practices during the late 1950’s and
early 1960’s would not be deemed satisfactory by today’s
standards of practice. However, retrofitting all structures to
accommodate the ever changing state-of-the-practice would be
impractical. Given the stability of the Upper Reservoir over the
40 plus year operational life, even with seepage pressures being
present before installation of the geosynthetic liner, inadequate
construction practices were likely not the cause of the Taum
Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure.
Spillways are typically specified to protect dams, dikes, and
reservoirs from the potentially devastating effects of overflowing
water. The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was designed without a
spillway system. One possible reason for not specifying a
spillway system for the Upper Reservoir was the lack of
topographic drainage area contribution to the total inflow. The
reservoir’s only contributions to inflow were the intended pumpback procedures for filling and direct rainfall on the Upper
Reservoir itself. This means that overtopping could be contrived
from over-pumping/overfilling or excess rainfall with the later
being highly improbable. Some form of spillway system could
prevent this catastrophic failure event.
In conclusion, the true cause of the December 14, 2005 failure
incident may never be ascertained but valuable insight and
knowledge into the most likely failure mechanism(s) contributing
to the event from research, study, and evaluation can be used to
prevent future catastrophes of this magnitude. An understanding
of failure events can be used as a tool to help protect the general
safety and well being of society as a whole against future
possibilities of dam, dike, and reservoir breaches. The Taum
Sauk Upper Reservoir failure serves as a lesson for Missouri as
well as the nation in regards to the importance of dam, dike, and
reservoir safety.
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The future of the Taum Sauk upper reservoir facility is now well
defined. The owner, AmerenUE, was given authorization to
rebuild at the same location. The current plans are to build a
roller-compacted concrete (RCC) reservoir dam. The design will
employ the latest in overflow structures, monitoring and control
systems, seismic design criteria and other safety features. This
new facility will be built using the existing materials from the
existing embankment dam. The announcement to start the
restoration project was made in late 2007 and as soon the testing,
analysis and design are finalized construction will start. More
information can be found at the owners website, click on:
http://www.ameren.com/TaumSauk/
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